Posts
I will summarize the main points that I have covered from this report in this post, as well as feature an interesting glimpse of optimism.
"Relative Certainties"
- A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of nonstate actors—businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks—also will increase.
- Continued economic growth—coupled with 1.2 billion more people by 2025— will put pressure on energy, food, andwater resources.
"Uncertainties"
- Whether an energy transition away from oil and gas—supported by improved energy storage, biofuels, and clean coal—is completed during the 2025 time frame.
- Whether mercantilism stages a comeback and global markets recede.
- Whether Europe and Japan overcome economic and social challenges caused or compounded by demography.
Without a doubt, we live in very interesting times. If we can predict anything, it is that the future will be unpredictable. I'll finish up with a portion of text that exudes optimism. Will it come true? Only time will tell.A Non-nuclear Korea?
We see a unified Korea as likely by 2025—if not as a unitary state, then in some form of North-South confederation. While diplomacy working to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program continues, the final disposition of the North’s nuclear infrastructure and capabilities at the time of reunification remain uncertain. A new, reunified Korea struggling with the large financial burden of reconstruction will, however, be more likely to find international acceptance and economic assistance by ensuring the denuclearization of the Peninsula, perhaps in a manner similar to what occurred in Ukraine post-1991. A loosely confederated Korea might complicate
denuclearization efforts. Other strategic consequences are likely to flow from Korean unification, including prospects for new levels of major power cooperation to manage new and enduring challenges, such as denuclearization, demilitarization, refugee flows, and financing reconstruction.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Saturday, December 13, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Final Thoughts
Tuesday, December 9, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
As highlighted in the previous two posts, Chapter Four deals with resources - and the possibility of conflict that could arise when these resources become scarce. Three main resources - the basics of life - have the highest potential for tension: food, water, and energy. While energy tends to dominate the headlines, food and water may loom just as large for certain populations.Experts currently consider 21 countries with a combined population of about 600 million to be either cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, home to about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025.
We in the U.S. may not think these resources are ever in danger, but in recent years there have been disputes over water rights in several Southern states. Not just in traditional desert states - in 2007 Georgia and the Carolinas had major water shortages. And water shortages could spell trouble for those who rely on irrigation to produce crops as well. The Ogallala Aquifer in the midwest is being rapidly depleted, per wikipedia:
...
The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a
result of growing world population, rising affluence, and shifts to Western dietary
preferences by a larger middle class. The global food sector has been highly responsive to market forces, but farm production probably will continue to be hampered by misguided agriculture policies that limit investment and distort critical price signals. Keeping food prices down to placate the urban poor and spur savings for industrial investment has distorted agricultural prices in the past. If political elites are more worried about urban instability than rural incomes—a safe bet in many countries—these policies are likely to persist, increasing the risk of tight supplies in the future. The demographic trend for increased urbanization—particularly in developing states—underscores the likelihood that failed policies will continue.
...
In addition to the currently projected scarcities of freshwater and cropland, the UK
Treasury-commissioned Stern Report estimates that by the middle of the century
200 million people may be permanently displaced “climate migrants”—representing a ten-fold increase over today’s entire documented refugee and internally displaced
populations. Although this is considered high by many experts, broad agreement exists about the risks of large scale migration and the need for better preparation. Most displaced persons traditionally relocate within their home countries, but in the future many are likely to find their home countries have diminishing capabilities to accommodate them. Thus the number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged into relatively privileged countries is likely to increase. The largest inflows will mirror many current migratory patterns—from North Africa and Western Asia into Europe, Latin America into the US, and Southeast Asia into Australia.The Ogallala Aquifer is being depleted at a rate of 12 cubic km (420,000 million ft3 or 9.7 million acre feet) per year, amounting to a total depletion to date of a volume equal to the annual flow of 18 Colorado Rivers. Some estimates say it will dry up in as little as 25 years. Many farmers in the Texas High Plains, which rely particularly on the underground source, are now turning away from irrigated agriculture as they become aware of the hazards of overpumping.
A comparable replacement for this water may simply not exist, and a large portion of the folks that rely on this water for drinking and employment may be forced to make very difficult choices. And the millions of people who rely on the food grown in these states will be competing for reduced global reserves.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Monday, December 8, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Winners/Losers in Post-Petroleum World
We believe the most likely occurrence by 2025 is a technological breakthrough that will provide an alternative to oil and natural gas, but implementation will lag because of the necessary infrastructure costs and need for longer replacement time. However, whether the breakthrough occurs within the 2025 time frame or later, the geopolitical implications of a shift away from oil and natural gas will be immense.
- Saudi Arabia will absorb the biggest shock, as its leaders will be forced to tighten up on the costs of the royal establishment. The regime could face new tensions with the Wahabi establishment as Riyadh seeks to promote a series of major economic reforms—including women’s full participation in the economy—and a new social contract with its public as it tries to institute a work ethic to accelerate development plans and diversify the economy.
For Iraq, emphasis on investing in non-oil sectors of its economy will increase. The smaller Gulf states, which have been making massive investments designed to transform themselves into global tourist and transport hubs, are likely to manage the transition well, bolstered by their robust sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Across the Arab world, SWFs are being deployed to develop non-oil sectors of the economy in a race against oil as a diminishing asset.
- In Iran, the drop in oil and gas prices will undermine any populist economic policies. Pressure for economic reform will increase, potentially putting pressure on the clerical governing elite to loosen its grip. Incentives to open up to the West in a bid for greater foreign investment, establishing or strengthening ties with Western partners—including with the US—will increase. Iranian leaders might be more willing to trade their nuclear policies for aid and trade.
Outside the Middle East, Russia will potentially be the biggest loser, particularly if its economy remains heavily tied to energy exports, and could be reduced to middle power status. Venezuela, Bolivia, and other petro-populist regimes could unravel completely, if that has not occurred beforehand because of already growing discontent and decreasing production. Absent support from Venezuela, Cuba might be forced to begin China-like market reforms.
Early oil decline states—those exporters which had peaked or were declining as is currently the case with Indonesia and Mexico—may be better prepared to shift the focus of their economic activities and diversify into non-energy sectors.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Saturday, December 6, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Timing is Everything
Chapter Four of Global Trends 2025 covers one of my favorite topics - resources. I'll begin the discussion by highlighting a section concerning alternative energy and the challenges that we face.Timing is Everything
Observations
All current technologies are inadequate for replacing traditional energy architectures on the scale needed, and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025 (see foldout). The present generation of biofuels is too expensive to grow, would further boost food prices, and their manufacture consumes essentially the same amount of energy they produce. Other ways of converting nonfood biomass resources to fuels and chemical products should be more promising, such as those based on high-growth algae or agricultural waste products, especially cellulosic biomass. Development of clean coal technologies and carbon capture and storage is gaining momentum and—if such technologies were cost-competitive by 2025—would enable coal to generate more electricity in a carbon-constrained regulatory environment. Long-lasting hydrogen fuel cells have potential, but they remain in their infancy and are at least a decade away from commercial production. Enormous infrastructure investment might be required to support a “hydrogen economy.” An Argonne National Laboratory study found that hydrogen, from well to tank, is likely to be at least twice as costly as gasoline.
Even with the favorable policy and funding environment that would be needed for biofuels, clean coal, or hydrogen, major technologies historically have had an “adoption lag.” A recent study found that in the energy sector, it takes an average of 25 years for a new production technology to become widely adopted. A major reason for this lag is the need for new infrastructure to handle major innovation. For energy in particular, massive and sustained infrastructure investments made for almost 150 years encompass production, transportation, refining, marketing, and retail activities. Adoption of natural gas, a fuel superior to oil in many respects, illustrates the difficulty of a transition to something new. Technologies to use natural gas have been widely available since at least the 1970s, yet natural gas still lags crude oil in the global market because the technical and investment requirements for producing and transporting it are greater than they are for oil-based fuels.
Simply meeting baseline energy demand over the next two decades is estimated to require more than $3 trillion of investment in traditional hydrocarbons by companies built up over more than a century and with market capitalizations in the hundreds of billions of dollars. Because a new form of energy is highly unlikely to use existing infrastructure without modifications, we expect any new form of energy to demand similarly massive investment.
Despite what are seen as long odds now, we cannot rule out the possibility of a transition by 2025 that would avoid the costs of an infrastructure overhaul. The greatest possibility for a relatively quick and inexpensive transition during that period comes from better renewable generation sources (photovoltaic and wind) and improvements in battery technology. With many of these technologies, the infrastructure cost hurdle for individual projects would be lower, enabling many small economic actors to develop their own energy transformation projects that directly serve their interests—e.g., stationary fuel cells powering homes and offices, recharging plug-in hybrid autos, and selling energy back to the grid. Also, energy conversion schemes—such as plans to generate hydrogen for automotive fuel cells from electricity in a homeowner’s garage—could avoid the need to develop complex hydrogen transportation infrastructure. Similarly, non-ethanol biofuels derived from genetically modified feed stocks may be able to leverage the considerable investment in liquid petroleum transport and distribution infrastructure.
- This highlights a need for increased research and development. Our current alternatives are not a realistic substitute to oil/coal/natural gas. America needs to lead in energy technology breakthroughs.
- We need to figure out which direction we are going in, and provide smart incentives to get there. I am a strong believer in the free market, but I think we have to have a plan with support from government and industry. Hopefully this can be rolled into (at least addressed) the Big 3's bailout/bankruptcy emergence.
- We should try to use technologies that use our current infrastructure as much as possible. More overlap means less adoption lag.
- Liquid fuels are going to continue to be key in the foreseeable future for large scale transport, agriculture and construction. We can leverage plug-in flex fuel hybrids for reducing light transport demand.
- The current global recession could have harmful effects on alternative energy development, or it could buy us desperately needed time. Perhaps a combination of both.
- Conservation efforts should be much easier with the current financial situation.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Monday, December 1, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Demographics of Discord
The second chapter of the report focuses on a topic that I feel has large implications on societies - past, present and future - and in the coming years will have distinct effects. It has been said that "Demography is Everything", and I feel the report captures several interesting trends that will shape our world.
Two of these trends include:
- Urbanization
- Aging Populations in Developed Nations
If current trends persist, by 2025 about 57 percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas, up from about 50 percent today. By 2025, the world will add another eight megacities to the current list of 19—all except one of these eight will be in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Most urban growth, however, will occur in smaller cities of these regions, which are expanding along highways and coalescing near crossroads and coastlines, often without formal sector job growth and without adequate services.Increased urbanization will have implications in maintaining access to food and clean water. The ability for these megacites to absorb new citizens will also be key. Large groups of unemployed, hungry, and disaffected people are highly unstable and prone to revolt and/or terrorism. These groups could push more and more failing states over the edge.
Aging Populations
Rapidly aging populations will have profound impacts on society. As retirees have fewer and fewer workers for support, a shift will have to occur. Either the society will increase fertility (much easier said than done), import workers through immigration, or benefits and support for the elderly will have to be reduced commensurately. Each of the options have implications on the stability of the nation or region.
In almost every developed country, the period of most rapid growth in the ratio of seniors (age 65 and older) to the working-age population will occur during the 2010s and 2020s, boosting the fiscal burden of old-age benefit programs. By 2010, there will be about one senior for every four working-age people in the developed world. By 2025, this ratio will have climbed to one to three, and possibly higher.As I examined here, the U.S. will be (perhaps already are?) facing a serious economic crossroads with regards to our social entitlement programs. It will take strong leadership, clear vision, and the ability for all parties to compromise in order to solve these complex problems. Many in my cohort are assuming Social Security will not be around for retirement and are planning accordingly. This is probably a good idea, but what about the many millions who are not?
Large and sustained increases in the fertility rate, even if they began now, would not reverse the aging trend for decades in Europe and Japan. If fertility rose immediately to the replacement level in Western Europe, the ratio of seniors to people in their working years would continue to rise steadily through the late 2030s. In Japan, it would continue to rise through the late 2040s.
The annual level of net immigration would have to double or triple to keep working-age populations from shrinking in Western Europe. By 2025, non-European minority populations could reach significant proportions—15 percent or more—in nearly all Western European countries and will have a substantially younger age structure than the native population (see page 20). Given growing discontent with current levels of immigrants among native Europeans, such steep increases are likely to heighten tensions.
The aging of societies will have economic consequences. Even with productivity increases, slower employment growth from a shrinking work force probably will reduce Europe’s already tepid GDP growth by 1 percent. By the 2030s, Japan’s GDP growth is projected to drop to near zero according to some models. The cost of trying to maintain pensions and health coverage will squeeze out expenditures on other priorities, such as defense.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Monday, November 24, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Globalization and the Crash of '08
Here is the next installment of my review of Global Trends 2025. This excerpt examines how the 2008 financial crisis may affect world relations.
Globalization at Risk with the 2008 Financial Crisis?Observations
As with most of the trends discussed in this report, the impacts from the financial crisis will depend heavily on government leadership. Proactive fiscal and monetary policies probably will ensure the current panic and likely deep national recessions will not turn into an extended depression, although reduced economic growth could slow globalization’s pace, increasing protectionist pressures and financial fragmentation.
The crisis is accelerating the global economic rebalancing. Developing countries have been hurt; several, such as Pakistan with its large current account deficit, are at considerable risk. Even those with cash reserves—such as South Korea and Russia—have been severely buffeted; steep rises in unemployment and inflation could trigger widespread political instability and throw emerging powers off course. However, if China, Russia, and Mideast oil exporters can avoid internal crises, they will be in a position to leverage their likely still sizeable reserves, buying foreign assets and providing direct financial assistance to still-struggling countries for political favors or to seed new regional initiatives. In the West, the biggest change — not anticipated before the crisis — is the increase in state power. Western governments now own large swaths of their financial sectors and must manage them, potentially politicizing markets.
The crisis has increased calls for a new “Bretton Woods” to better regulate the global economy. World leaders, however, will be challenged to renovate the IMF and devise a globally transparent and effective set of rules that apply to differing capitalisms and levels of financial institutional development. Failure to construct a new all-embracing architecture could lead countries to seek security through competitive monetary policies and new investment barriers, increasing the potential for market segmentation.
- This report is highly optimistic that these "proactive" measures will have a lasting positive effect on the world economic system. From my layman's viewpoint, the measures seem anything but proactive and coordinated, and very well could do more harm than good.
- I agree that there will certainly be calls for more protectionism and isolationism here in the US in the near term.
- A big question is how low commodity prices will drop, and how long they will stay there. (See deflation) Big energy producers will have fewer options with declining oil and gas prices. This could exacerbate internal strife in these nations.
- The nationalization of financial institutions certainly concerns me as well, and it is not clear that the financial sector is where these intrusions will end.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Update
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) has released its final version of the report Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. (pdf here) Here are some initial assessments:
- The whole international system—as constructed following WWII—will be revolutionized. Not only will new players—Brazil, Russia, India and China— have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.
- The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future.
- Unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5 billion more people, will put pressure on resources—particularly energy, food, and water—raising the specter of scarcities emerging as demand outstrips supply.
- The potential for conflict will increase owing partly to political turbulence in parts of the greater Middle East.
The most dramatic difference between Mapping the Global Future: Report of the Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project and Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World is the latter’s assumptions of a multipolar future, and therefore dramatic changes in the international system. The 2025 report describes a world in which the US plays a prominent role in global events, but the US is one among many global actors who manage problems. In contrast, the 2020 report projects continued US dominance, positing that most major powers have forsaken the idea of balancing the US.Next, the hazards and pitfalls of attempting to foretell the future are examined. Predictions such as these are notoriously inaccurate, so a grain of salt is in order.
The two documents also differ in their treatment of energy supply, demand, and new alternative sources. In 2020, energy supplies “in the ground” are considered "sufficient to meet global demand.” What is uncertain, according to the earlier report, is whether political instability in producer countries, supply disruptions, or competition for resources might deleteriously affect international oil markets. Though 2020 mentions the global increase in energy consumption, it emphasizes the domination of fossil fuels. In contrast, 2025 sees the world in the midst of a transition to cleaner fuels. New technologies are projected to provide the capability for fossil
fuel substitutes and solutions to water and food scarcity. The 2020 report acknowledges that energy demands will influence superpower relations, but the 2025 report considers energy scarcity as a driving factor in geopolitics.
Both reports project probable strong global economic growth—fueled by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, absent major shocks. The 2025 report, however, assesses the likelihood of major discontinuities to be high, emphasizing that “no single outcome seems preordained” and that the next 20 years of transition toward a new international system are fraught with risks, such as a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and possible interstate conflicts over resources.
The scenarios in both reports address the future of globalization, the future structure of the international system, and the dividing lines among groups that will cause conflict or convergence. In both reports, globalization is seen as a driver so pervasive that it will reorder current divisions based on geography, ethnicity, and religious and socio-economic status.
In the 20th century, experts forecasting the next 20 years—roughly the time frame of this study—often missed major geopolitical events, basing their predictions largely on linear projections without exploring possibilities that could cause discontinuities. Before WW I, while tensions between European “great powers” were on the rise, few had an inkling of major changes in the offing, from the extent of mutual slaughter to the downfall of age-old empires. In the early 1920s, few envisioned the lethal situation about to unfold, ushered in by the Great Depression, Stalin’s gulags, and an even more bloody world war encompassing multiple genocides. The postwar period saw the establishment of a new international system—many of whose institutions—the UN and Bretton Woods—remain with us. Although the bipolar and nuclear age did not lack war and conflict, it did provide a stable framework until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The development of a globalized economy in which China and India play major roles has opened a new era without clear outcomes.
Lessons from the last century, however, appear to suggest:
- Leaders and their ideas matter. No history of the past hundred years can be told without delving into the roles and thinking of such leaders as Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler or Mao Zedong. The actions of dominating leaders are the hardest element to anticipate. At several junctures in the 20th century, Western experts thought liberal and market ideas had triumphed. As demonstrated by the impacts of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Truman, leadership is key even in societies where institutions are strong and the maneuvering room for wielding personal power is more constrained.
- Economic volatility introduces a major risk factor. Historians and social scientists have discovered a strong correlation between rapid economic change—both positive and negative—and political instability. The massive dislocation and economic volatility introduced by the end of the “first” globalization in 1914-1918 and the rise of protectionist barriers in the 1920s and 1930s, combined with the lingering resentments over the Versailles peace settlement, laid the groundwork for WW II. The collapse of multinational and ethnic empires—begun after WW I and continuing with the end of the colonial empires in the post-WW II period—also unleashed a long series of national and ethnic conflicts that reverberates today. Today’s globalization also has spurred the movement of people, disrupting traditional social and geographic boundaries.
- Geopolitical rivalries trigger discontinuities more than does technological change.
Many stress the role of technology in bringing about radical change and there is no question it has been a major driver. We—as others—have oftentimes underestimated its impact. However, over the past century, geopolitical rivalries and their consequences have been more significant causes of the multiple wars, collapse of empires, and rise of new powers than technology alone.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Thursday, October 2, 2008
Global Trends 2025: Update
I thought I would provide an addendum to the post on Global Trends 2025, since I found a little additional related information.
First, here is the transcript of Thomas Fingar's speech, so you can read it for yourself.
Next, another National Intelligence Council Report, that outlines Six Technologies With Potential Impacts to U.S. Interests out to 2025:
- Energy Storage Materials
- Biofuels and Bio-Based Chemicals
- Clean Coal Technologies
- Service Robotics
- The Internet of Things Several of these technologies could have direct effects on two of the main concerns of my blog - demographics and energy. These effects may not always be in our best interest.
Some highlights:Biogerontechnology offers the means to accomplish control over and improvement in the human condition, and promises improvements in lifespan.
Check out the link for the full report. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World can be found here.
Nations will be challenged as a result of changing demographic structures, new psychologies, activity patterns of aging yet healthy citizens, and the resulting requirement to formulate new national economic and social policies .
Energy Storage technologies have the potential to disrupt the way energy is stored and distributed for use in transportation and portable devices.
Biofuels and bio-based chemicals production technologies have the only potential near-term capability to provide alternatives to conventional gasoline and diesel-fuel and petrochemical feedstocks.
A large-scale move to energy-efficient biofuels could increase US energy security and ease international competition for world oil supplies and reserves.
Clean coal technologies and an array of related technologies offer the potential to improve electrical generation efficiency, lower emissions of harmful pollutants, and provide fuels and chemical feedstocks from available coal resources.
The development and implementation of robots for elder-care applications, and the development of human-augmentation technologies, mean that robots could be working alongside humans in looking after and rehabilitating people. A change in domestic and social responsibilities and a change in domestic employment requirements could adversely affect lower income service-oriented workers.
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts
Friday, September 12, 2008
Global Trends 2025
In the years ahead, Washington will no longer be in a position to dictate what new global structures will look like. Nor will any other country, Fingar said. "There is no nobody in a position . . . to take the lead and institute the changes that almost certainly must be made in the international system," he said. The predicted shift toward a less U.S.-centric world will come at a time when the planet is facing a growing environmental crisis, caused largely by climate change, Fingar said. By 2025, droughts, food shortages and scarcity of fresh water will plague large swaths of the globe, from northern China to the Horn of Africa. Floods and droughts will trigger mass migrations and political upheaval in many parts of the developing world. But among industrialized states, declining birthrates will create new economic stresses as populations become grayer. In China, Japan and Europe, the ratio of working adults to seniors "begins to approach one to three," he said. The United States will fare better than many other industrial powers, in part because it is relatively more open to immigration. Newcomers will inject into the U.S. economy a vitality that will be absent in much of Europe and Japan -- countries that are "on a good day, highly chauvinistic," he said. 
Editors Note: for those looking for the final report, see here.
Here is an unsettling report, from the Washington Post:
The presidential candidates will soon receive a briefing from our nation's Intelligence Community with the upcoming 'Global Trends 2025', an overview of international factors that will shape our world and our place in it. Dr. Thomas Fingar, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, recently gave a preview of the key findings. It is not a cheery picture."The U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished," Fingar said, according to a transcript of the Thursday speech. He saw U.S. leadership eroding "at an accelerating pace" in "political, economic and arguably, cultural arenas."
I look forward to the actual "Global Trends 2025" report, due out later this year. But the key notes are chilling enough. Reports like these really cause me concern. This is not some crazy doomer on a wacko peak oil message board. This is a consensus of top American Intelligence Community officials. Perhaps no matter how much we wish that The Long Emergency or Long Road Down are only apocalyptic fantasy, they may be reality. And that reality may be sooner than we realize...
Other Global Trends Posts:
Global Trends 2025
Global Trends Update
Global Trends Update II
Globalization and the Crash of '08
Demographics of Discord
Timing is Everything
Winners and Losers in a Post-Petroleum World
Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty
Final Thoughts